




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# A few open problems in computer security

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David Wagner  
University of California, Berkeley

# Overview of the field



- ◆ Communication security through *cryptography*
- ◆ Endpoint security through *systems techniques*



# Background

## Goals:

- ◆ Confidentiality
- ◆ Integrity
- ◆ Availability

... even in the presence of  
a malicious adversary!

## Problems:

- ◆ Today's systems often fail to meet these goals
- ◆ Security is often an afterthought




# Part 1: Critical Infrastructure

# Infrastructure protection

- ◆ Critical infrastructures
    - e.g., power, water, oil, gas, telecom, banking, ...
    - Evolving legacy systems
    - Increasingly reliant on I.T.
    - Very large scale
    - *Tightly interdependent*
- ⇒ Security is a challenge!




# The electric power grid




- ◆ Elements
  - Loads (users)
  - Distribution (local area)
  - Transmission (long-distance)
  - Generators (adapt slowly)
  - Control centers
  - Bidding & coordination
  - Communication networks

# Cascading failures




March 1989: Solar storms cause outages in Quebec, trips interlocks throughout the US

- ◆ Generation capacity margin at only 12% (down from 25% in 1980)
- ◆ Will get worse over next decade: demand grows 20%, transmission capacity grows 3% (projected)



August 1996: Two faults in Oregon cause oscillations that lead to blackouts in 13 states

# Transmission: An example?




- ↑ capacity 100Kv
- ↑ capacity 25Kv
- ↑ capacity 75Kv




# Transmission: An example?

Line failure!




# Transmission: An example?




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
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
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


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
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
# Possible research problems

- ◆ Modelling an infrastructural system
  - Can we construct a useful predictive model?
  - Given a model, can we efficiently measure its security against malicious attack?
- ◆ Structural properties of such systems
  - What key parameters determine their properties?
  - Are there local control rules that ensure global stability?
  - How can we design inherently self-stabilizing systems?



# Part 2: Algebraic Crypto


# What's a block cipher?




$E_k : X \rightarrow X$  bijective for all  $k$

# When is a block cipher secure?

Answer: when these two black boxes are indistinguishable.




# Example: The AES



$S(x) = l(x^{-1})$  in  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ , where  $l$  is  $\text{GF}(2)$ -linear and the MDS matrix and byte re-ordering are  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ -linear

# Interpolation attacks

Express cipher as a polynomial in the message & key:



- ◆ Write  $E_k(x) = p(x)$ , then interpolate from known texts
  - ◆ Or,  $p'(E_k(x)) = p(x)$
- ◆ Generalization: probabilistic interpolation attacks
  - ◆ Noisy polynomial reconstruction, decoding Reed-Muller codes

# Rational interpolation attacks


Express the cipher as a rational polynomial:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} X & \xrightarrow{\text{id}} & X \\ \downarrow E_k & & \downarrow p/q \\ X & \xrightarrow{\text{id}} & X \end{array}$$

- ◆ If  $E_k(x) = p(x)/q(x)$ , then:
  - ◆ Write  $E_k(x) \times q(x) = p(x)$ , and apply linear algebra
  - ◆ Note: rational poly's are closed under composition
- ◆ Are probabilistic rational interpolation attacks feasible?

# Resultants


A unifying view: bivariate polynomials:



- ◆ The small diagrams commute if  $p_i(x, f_i(x)) = 0$  for all  $x$
- ◆ Small diagrams can be composed to obtain  $q(x, f_2(f_1(x))) = 0$ , where  $q(x, z) = \text{res}_y(p_1(x, y), p_2(y, z))$
- ◆ Some details not worked out...



# Public-key encryption



Let  $S(x) = x^3$  in  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ . Define  $f = L' \circ S \circ L$ .

Private key:  $L, L'$ , a pair of  $\text{GF}(2^8)$ -linear maps

Public key:  $f$ , given explicitly by listing its coefficients

# The MP problem

- ◆ Find semi-efficient algorithms for the following:
  - Let  $f_1, \dots, f_m$  be multivariate polynomials in  $n$  unknowns over a finite field  $K$ , and consider the system of equations
$$f_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 0$$
$$\dots$$
$$f_m(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 0$$
  - Often:  $f_i$  are sparse, low degree, and  $K = \text{GF}(2^q)$  for  $q \leq 8$
  - Also, the case  $m \gg n$  is of special interest in crypto

# What's known about MP?

- ◆ For quadratic equations (degree 2):
  - $m \geq n^2/2$ : polynomial time via linearization
  - $m \geq \epsilon n^2$ : polynomial time via re-linearization, XL
  - $m \geq n^2 + c$ : conjectured subexponential time via XL
  - $m = n$ : hard? (NP-complete worst-case)

Why not existing Groebner base algorithms?

- exponential running time ( $n \gg 15$  is infeasible)
- not optimized for small fields





# Summary



- ◆ Critical infrastructure protection
  - An important area, and
  - A source of intellectually satisfying problems
- ◆ Algebraic cryptosystems of growing importance
  - Collaboration between cryptographic and mathematical communities might prove fruitful here



# Backup Slides



# Power grid security

- ◆ Eligible Receiver (Nov 97): NSA hackers take down part of power grid, E911 in simulated attack using off-the-shelf software
- ◆ Zenith Star (Oct 99): little improvement
- ◆ Vulnerability assessments: control systems connected to Internet, dialup modems with poor passwords, using weak software