Newsgroups: comp.society.privacy
From: David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
Posted on: 1998/11/25
Message-ID: <comp-privacy13.27.5@cs.uwm.edu>
Approved: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Organization: ISAAC Group, UC Berkeley
                                                                        


    Usenet Reader <use94368@mab.ecse.rpi.NOSPAM.edu> wrote: The
    Wall Street Journal for Nov 5 (or maybe the 4th) had a big
    front page article on how info brokers illegally obtain private
    info on people.  E.g., if a lawyer is considering suing someone,
    first he may pay $100 to get that person's bank balance, to
    see whether he is suitable.

Most people don't realize it, but it's far worse than this.  With
most banks, once you have a target's account number, you can readily
learn their account balance.

Most banks have an automated dial-up service to help merchants
check whether a check will clear.  You punch in a number; the voice
response system tells you whether they have at least that much
money currently in their account.

Now the algorithm for recovering someone's account balance should
be clear: a simple binary search suffices.  In other words, punch
in $1000; if the computer says "more", try $2000; if the computer
then says "less", try $1500; etc.  This can be readily automated
with a computer + modem, or (more cheaply for most lawyers) just
hire an intern at minimum wages.

And it gets better.  You can use this technique to ascertain
someone's exact salary, down to the penny.  Find out their account
balance on Oct 31.  Then find it out on Nov 1, just after their
direct deposit check clears.  For best results, just query their
account balance every day for a few months to build up a picture
of their spending habits and income.

At this point you probably don't believe me.  Try it.  I've tried
it, on myself, and on others.

Or maybe you think such behavior would be easily detected.  Maybe
not.  I went and complained to my bank, and they told me that they
not only was this vulnerability present, but worse -- They had
absolutely no audit logs.  They had no thresholds in place.  They
had no way to check whether anyone had ever queried my account in
the past.  And they had no intent to change things.

In fact, it turns out that even the manager at my local bank didn't
know the feature existed.  He didn't believe me -- until I showed
him with his desk phone.  (Even then, he had to call headquarters
to confirm...)  Just goes to show you how little-known this problem
is.

If you're wondering whether there's any way to defend yourself, go
talk to your bank.  See if your bank has an automated bank account
balance service.  If so, complain.  In my case, the bank was able
to mark my account as "high risk for fraud".  They also placed a
password on my account, which had the side effect of disabling the
automated voice response system.  (Or I suppose you can get an
account offshore in some jurisdiction where they actually care
about banking privacy.)

Another observation.  If I wanted to write the software to do the
autodialing, I could have used the automated response system to
identify all the account numbers of everyone who had an account at
some specified branch, as well as their balances (but not their
names, as far as I can tell).  I imagine the designers probably
didn't intend to build that feature into the automated voice response
system...

    This raises a question: how do I cash a check w/o revealing my
    account?

Yeah, good question.  As far as I can tell, the answer is:  You
don't.  Sorry.
