Web Security (II)

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Administrative Stuff

- Proposal feedback
 - Revised proposal due Oct 22
 - » Timeline
 - » More clear description of problem & approach
 - Feedback on Oct 23
 - » 3:30-5:30pm
 - » Each group 10mins
 - » Sign-up sheet
- BitBlaze info session
 - 5pm, Soda 405



Same-Origin Principle (SOP)

- Documents or scripts loaded from one origin cannot get or set properties of documents from a different origin
- Origin
 - Two pages have the same origin if the protocol, port, host are the same for both pages
- The origin of a script
 - The origin that a script is loaded is the origin of the document that contains the script rather than the origin that hosts the script
 - E.g., a.com/service.html contain <script src=<u>http://b.com/lib.js</u>-, can lib.js access a.com's or b.com's HTML DOM objects?

Problems with SOP

- Rigid: all-or-nothing – Insufficient for Mashup
- Too coarse-grained if site hosts unrelated pages
 - Example: Web server often hosts sites for unrelated parties
 - » http://www.example.com/account/
 - » http://www.example.com/otheraccount/
 - Same-origin policy, allows script on one page to access properties of document from another

Trust Models in Mashup

Content provider P, content integrator T

	P trusts T to ac- cess P's content	T trusts P to access T's resources	Content type
1 2	No	No	isolated access-controlled
3	No	Yes	open
4	Yes	No	unauthorized
5	Yes	Yes	open

cess P's content	T trusts P to access T's resources	Content type	Abstraction	Run-as Principa
No	No	isolated access-controlled	<frame/> <serviceinstance> & CommRequest</serviceinstance>	Provider Provider
No	Yes	open	<script>(bad practice)</td><td>Integrator</td></tr><tr><td>Yes</td><td>No</td><td>unauthorized</td><td><Sandbox> <OpenSandbox></td><td>None</td></tr><tr><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>open</td><td><Script></td><td>Integrator</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>No</td><td>No Yes Yes No</td><td>Yes open Yes No Was Unauthorized</td><td>access-controlled CServiceInstance> & CommRequest No Yes open Script>(bad practice) Yes No umauthorized Sandbox> < OpenSandbox></td></tr></tbody></table></script>	

8



What Other Methods Can We Design to Address These Problems?

- Capabilities
 - How capabilities may be used here?
 - Advantages?
 - Disadvantages?
- Crypto

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
- How crypto may be used here?
- Advantages?
- Disadvantages?
- What other methods?

Discussion

- How to compare with Tahoma?
- Open Mic
 - Questions, comments?

Input Validation in Web Security

- System takes input strings
- Incorporates input into output
- Output is interpreted
- Unexpected input may cause problems
- Examples
 - SQL Command Injection Attack
 - » 60% web applications vulnerable
 - » 100ks of private records exposed in 1 attack
 - Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack
 - » More than 21% vulnerabilities reported to CVE
 » #1 reported vulnerability, surpassing buffer overflows



Defenses

12

- Input filtering
 - -Issues?
- MashupOS' defense against XSS?
- Other methods?