# CS 194: Lecture 28 Sensornets Review, Part II Location of exam: A1 HEARST ANNEX Incentives

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## **Special Topics**


- DHTs (mostly covered in project)
- Robust protocols
- Resource allocation


# **Three Classes of DHT Applications** · Rendezvous: uses DHT to store current "location" Storage: uses DHT to store data objects - Case 1: only uses put/get interface - Case 2: data manipulated in an application-specific manner • Routing: uses DHT to contact all DHT nodes along the path to the appropriate DHT "root". 3


## **Rendezvous Applications** Each client (telephony, chat, etc.) periodically stores the IP address (and other metadata) describing where they can be contacted • When A wants to contact B, it first does a get on B's key, and then contacts B directly This can handle: - IP mobility - Chat - Internet telephony - DNS - The Web! 4


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
# **Storage Applications** File Systems Backup Archiving Electronic Mail Content Distribution Networks • ..... 5





























## Library or Service


- Library: DHT code bundled into application
  - Runs on each node running application
  - Each application requires own routing infrastructure
  - Allows customization of interface
  - Very flexible, but much duplication
- Service: single DHT shared by applications
  - Requires common infrastructure
  - But eliminates duplicate routing systems
  - Harder to get, and much less flexible, but easier on each individual app







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


Generality of Interface Three classes of DHT interfaces: • Routing: app-specific code at each hop • Lookup: app-specific code at endpoint

Storage: put/get

For a shared infrastructure that can't incorporate app-specific code, the only choice is put/get

- Limited flexibility
- Does convenience outweigh constraints?



- takes application lookup(key) calls and returns with proper IP address (of external node) using put/get interface on OpenDHT
- Works for storage apps, and many routing apps can be converted to storage....

## **Sensornet Characteristics**

- Energy constraints: communication more expensive tham computation
- Harsh conditions: radio connectivity variable
- Self-organizing: no manual configuration
- Data-centric (not node-centric): users want data, but don't know which node has the data....

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## Isn't the Internet Robust?

- Robustness was one of the Internet's original design goals
- Adopted failure-oriented design style:
  - Hosts responsible for error recovery
  - Critical state refreshed periodically
  - Failure assumed to be the common case
- Proof from experience: Internet has withstood some major outages with minimal service interruption
  - 9/11
  - Baltimore tunnel fire
  - etc.

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## Counterexamples

- Arpanet routing problem
- Frequent routing failures due to misconfiguration
- Vulnerability to congestion control misbehavior
- Vulnerability to SYN floods
- .....

## **General Lesson**

- Most Internet protocols are design with (at most) two failure models in mind:
  - Participating nodes: fail-stop
  - Other nodes: malicious
    - Denial-of-service, spoofing, etc.
- They are usually vulnerable to participating nodes
   misbehaving:
  - Subverted nodes
  - Misconfigured nodes
  - Bug in software

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# Semantic vs Syntactic Failures Syntactic failures: Node doesn't respond, message ill-formed, etc. Semantic failure: Node responds with well-formed message, that is semantically incorrect Internet designed for syntactic failures, not semantic ones

## Why Didn't Traditional Tools Work?


- Formal verification: Verifies that <u>correct</u> protocol operation leads to the desired result
- Cryptographic authentication: Verifies <u>who</u> is talking, but not <u>what</u> they say
- Fault-tolerance via consensus: (Byzantine techniques)
   Requires that several nodes have enough information to do the
   required computation


In network routing, for instance, only the nodes at the end of a link know about its existence


## **Some Guidelines**

- 1. Value conceptual simplicity
- 2. Minimize your dependencies
- 3. Verify when possible
- 4. Protect your resources
- 5. Limit scope of vulnerability
- 6. Expose Errors
- #3 and #4 pose the most difficult technical challenges

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## **Robust Congestion Signaling (Real)**


- Use ECN bits in IP header to send two separate signals:
   Congestion-bit: on or off
  - Nonce: randomly 0 or 1
- When congestion bit is set, nonce is erased
- · Receiver must send back cumulative sum of nonces in ACK
- When congestion is signaled, receiver can't see nonce, so must guess about it


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
- Improbable it can continue to guess right


# Protecting Resources Different contexts: web servers: SYN cookies routers: fair queueing ....

- Will describe fair queueing
   Can be used to support QoS
  - But was initially proposed to protect flows from each other












## **Implementing Fair Queueing**


- Fluid model: have queue for each flow, and serve each flow in a bit-by-bit round robin
  - Let V(t) denote the "virtual time",which is the round number in progress at time t
  - $\partial V/\partial t = C/n(t)$  where n(t) is the number of flows with nonempty queues
- Packet model: send packets in the order that they would have finished in the fluid model
  - If you calculate finishing times in terms of V(t) rather than t, you don't have to change when new packets arrive











## **Three Questions**

- What is the result of selfish behavior? (Nash equilibrium)  $r_i = 1/(n\!+\!1)\,$  where n is number of users
  - $U_{tot} = (n+1)^{-2}$
- What is the socially optimal level of usage?
  - r<sub>i</sub> = 1/2n
  - $U_{tot} = 1/4$
- What packet scheduling algorithm would have a Nash equilibrium with the socially optimal usage?
   Fair queueing

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### **Designing for Selfishness**

- Assume every user (provider) cares only about their own performance (profit)
- Give each user a set of actions
- Design a "mechanism" that maps action vectors into a system-wide outcome
  - Mechanism design
- Choose a mechanism so that user selfishness leads to socially desirable outcome

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- Nash equilibrium, or other equilibrium concepts

## Strategyproof Mechanism

- · Clients have no incentive to lie
- They are asked to reveal their utility
- And no matter what other clients do, they are at least as well off telling the truth
- Examples:
  - second-price auction
  - VCG mechanisms