CS 268: Lecture 19 (Malware)

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(Based on slides from Vern Paxson and Stefan Savage)

Motivation

- Internet currently used for important services
 Financial transactions, medical records
- Could be used in the future for *critical* services
 911, surgical operations, energy system control, transportation system control
- Networks more open than ever before Global, ubiquitous Internet, wireless
- Malicious Users
- Selfish users: want more network resources than you
 Malicious users: would hurt you even if it doesn't get them more network resources

Network Security Problems

- Host Compromise
 - Attacker gains control of a host
- Denial-of-Service
 Attacker prevents legitimate users from gaining service
- Attack can be both
 - E.g., host compromise that provides resources for denial-of-service

Host Compromise

- One of earliest major Internet security incidents
 Internet Worm (1988): compromised almost every BSDderived machine on Internet
- Today: estimated that a single worm could compromise 10M hosts in < 5 min
- Attacker gains control of a host
 - Read data
 - Erase data
 - Compromise another host
 - Launch denial-of-service attacks on another host

Definitions

Worm


- Replicates itself
- Usually relies on stack overflow attack
- Virus
 - Program that attaches itself to another (usually trusted)
 - program
- Trojan horse
 - Program that allows a hacker a back way
 - Usually relies on user exploitation
- Botnet
 - A collection of programs running autonomously and controlled remotely
 - Can be used to spread out worms, mounting DDoS attacks


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
Host Compromise: Stack Overflow


- Typical code has many bugs because those bugs are not triggered by common input
- Network code is vulnerable because it accepts input from the network
- Network code that runs with high privileges (i.e., as root) is especially dangerous
 E.g., web server


Example
 What is wrong here?
<pre>// Copy a variable length user name from a packet #define MAXNAMELEN 64 int offset = OFFSET_USERNAME; char username[MAXNAMELEN]; int name_len;</pre>
<pre>name_len = packet[offset]; memcpy(&username, packet[offset + 1], name_len);</pre>
0 34 packet name_len name











Worm Examples

- Morris worm (1988)
- Code Red (2001)
- MS Slammer (January 2003)
- MS Blaster (August 2003)

Morris Worm (1988)

- Infect multiple types of machines (Sun 3 and VAX)
 Spread using a Sendmail bug
- Attack multiple security holes including
 - Buffer overflow in fingerd
 - Debugging routines in Sendmail
 - Password cracking
- Intend to be benign but it had a bug
 - Fixed chance the worm wouldn't quit when reinfecting a machine → number of worm on a host built up rendering the machine unusable

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Code Red Worm (2001)


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
- Attempts to connect to TCP port 80 on a randomly chosen host
- If successful, the attacking host sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the victim, attempting to exploit a buffer overflow
- Worm "bug": all copies of the worm use the same random generator to scan new hosts
 - DoS attack on those hosts
 - Slow to infect new hosts
- 2nd generation of Code Red fixed the bug!
 - It spread much faster

• Uses UDP port 1434 to exploit a buffer overflow in MS SQL server

- Effect
 - Generate massive amounts of network packetsBrought down as many as 5 of the 13 internet root
- name servers

 Others
 - The worm only spreads as an in-memory process: it never writes itself to the hard drive
 - · Solution: close UDP port on fairewall and reboot





MS Blaster (August 2003)

- Exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability of the RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service
- Scan a random IP range to look for vulnerable systems on TCP port 135
- Open TCP port 4444, which could allow an attacker to execute commands on the system
- DoS windowsupdate.com on certain versions of Windows

Hall of Shame

- Software that have had many stack overflow bugs:
 BIND (most popular DNS server)
 - RPC (Remote Procedure Call, used for NFS)
 - NFS (Network File System), widely used at UCB
 - Sendmail (most popular UNIX mail delivery software)
 - IIS (Windows web server)
 - SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol, used to manage routers and other network devices)

Spreading faster—distributed coordination (*Warhol* worms)

- Idea 1: reduce redundant scanning.
 - Construct permutation of address space.
 - Each new worm instance starts at random point
 - Worm instance that "encounters" another instance rerandomizes
- Idea 2: reduce slow startup phase.
 - Construct a "hit-list" of vulnerable servers in advance Then: for 1M vulnerable hosts, 10K hit-list, 100 scans/worm/sec, 1 sec to infect \rightarrow 99% infection in 5 minutes.

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Spreading still faster — Flash worms

- Idea: use an Internet-sized hit list.
 - Initial copy of the worm has the entire hit list
 - Each generation, infects n from the list, gives each $1/n \ of \ list$
 - Need to engineer for locality, failure & redundancy.
 - But: n = 10 requires, 7 generations to infect 10⁷ hosts \rightarrow tens of seconds.

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How can we defend against Internetscale worms?

- Time scales rule out human intervention → Need automated detectors, response (And perhaps honeypots to confuse scanning?)
- Very hard research question!
- And it's only half of the problem . . .

Contagion worms

Suppose you have two exploits: Es (Web server) and Ec (Web client)
You infect a server (or client) with Es (Ec)
Then you . . . wait (Perhaps you bait, e.g., host porn)
When vulnerable client arrives, infect it
You send over *both* Es and Ec

As client happens to visit other vulnerable servers) infects


Contagion worms (cont'd)


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- No change in communication patterns, other than slightly larger-than-usual transfers
- How do you detect this?
- How bad can it be?


Outline


- Worm propagation
- > Threat detection content sifting








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



























































Experience Quite good. Detected and automatically generated signatures for every known worm outbreak over eight months. Can produce a precise signature for a new worm in a fraction of a second. Software implementation keeps up with 200Mbps Known worms detected! Code Red, Nimda, WebDav, Slammer, Opaserv, ... Unknown worms (with no public signatures) detected: MsBlaster, Bagle, Sasser, Kibvu, ...

(Stefan Savage, UCSD *)





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Common protocol headers	GNUTELLA.CONNECT
 Mainly HTTP and SMTP headers Distributed (P2P) system protocol headers Procedural whitelist Small number of popular protocols Non-worm epidemic Activity SPAM BitTorrent 	<pre>.3. X-Dynamic-Qu erying: 0.1.X-V ersion: 4.0.4.X -Query-Routing: 0.1.User-Agent: .LimeWire/4.0.6Vendor-Message: .0.1.X-Ultrapee r-Query-Routing:</pre>