Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance

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Why Byzantine Fault Tolerance?

- Traditional fault tolerance:
 - Processes fail by stopping or omitting steps
- Byzantine fault tolerance:
 - "No" assumptions on faulty behavior
 - Robust to increasingly common faults:
 - Hacker-tolerance
 - Bug-tolerance

Previous Work

- Mostly theoretical
 - Few implementations
 - Little analysis
- Rely on synchrony for correctness
 - Attack: delay nodes or communication
- Slow

[Rampart,SecureRing,Phalanx,...]

Contributions

- Practical:
 - Correct in asynchronous systems
 - Liveness under attack
 - Fast
- Implementation
 - Generic replication library
 - BFS a Byzantine-fault-tolerant NFS
- Performance evaluation

Talk Overview

- Algorithm
- Optimizations
- BFS
- Performance evaluation
- Conclusions

What the Algorithm Does


clients

- Arbitrary replicated service
- Safety and liveness:
 - Service behaves as a correct centralized one
 - Clients eventually receive replies to requests
- Assumptions:
 - 3f+1 replicas to tolerate f faults (optimal)
 - Strong cryptography (reasonable)
 - Unknown eventual bounds (only for liveness)

Algorithm Overview

State machine replication

- Deterministic replicas start in same state
- Execute same requests in same order
- Client waits for f+1 matching replies





To agree on a total order


- Primary picks ordering
- Backups ensure primary behaves
 - certify correct actions
 - trigger view changes

Ensuring Safety

- Three phase protocol:
 - pre-prepare, prepare and commit
 - pre-prepare and prepare order within views
 - prepare and commit order across views
- · Messages are authenticated
 - $-\langle \bullet \rangle_{\sigma I}$ denotes a messaged signed by I
- Replicas remember messages received in log







- committed(m,v,n,i) = prepared and 2f+1 commits for m,v,n
- Execute after all m' with lower sequence numbers
- If committed(m,v,n,i), prepared(m,v,n,i) for f+1 non-faulty


View Changes

- · Liveness when primary fails:
 - Backups multicast view-change messages
 - Primary ≡ view number modulo number of replicas
 - New primary multicasts new-view message
- Ordering across views:
 - Information about *prepared* requests in view-changes
 - New-view message:
 - includes 2f+1 view-change messages
 - contains committed request information
 - only accept messages consistent with new-view

Distinct m and m' never committed for same n

Garbage Collection


- Discard logged information after having proof:
 - request was executed by f+1 non-faulty
 - state after request execution is correct




- periodically checkpoint state
- multicast ⟨CHECKPOINT,v,n,D(state),i⟩_{Oi}
 digest of checkpoint
- Proof = 2f+1 matching checkpoint messages
- Discard messages and checkpoints that precede proof
- Efficient: copy-on-write and incremental digest of checkpoints

Optimizations

- Digest replies: only one reply with full result
- Optimistic execution: execute *prepared* requests
 - Operations execute in 2 round-trips
- Read-only operations: executed in current state
 - Read-only operations execute in 1 round-trip
- Fast authentication: MACs in normal case
 - MAC 1000x faster than public-key signatures
 - Non-trivial: cannot prove authenticity to third party





Conclusions

Byzantine fault tolerance is practical:

- Low impact on latency
- Works in asynchronous systems

Extensions:

- Recovery
- Fault-tolerant privacy
- Witnesses
- Reduce number of copies of state