
Review: RPC Information Flow


CS162 Operating Systems and Systems Programming Lecture 26

Protection and Security in Distributed Systems

December 1st, 2008 Prof. John Kubiatowicz http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs162



Review: Distributed File Systems





- VFS: Virtual File System layer
 - Provides mechanism which gives same system call interface for different types of file systems
- Distributed File System:
 - Transparent access to files stored on a remote disk » NFS: Network File System
 - » AFS: Andrew File System
 - Caching for performance
- Cache Consistency: Keeping contents of client caches consistent with one another
 - If multiple clients, some reading and some writing, how do stale cached copies get updated?
 - NFS: check periodically for changes
- AFS: clients register callbacks so can be notified by server of changes

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Goals for Today

- Finish discussing distributed file systems/Caching
- Security Mechanisms
 - Authentication
 - Authorization
 - Enforcement
- Cryptographic Mechanisms

Note: Some slides and/or pictures in the following are adapted from slides ©2005 Silberschatz, Galvin, and Gagne. Many slides generated from my lecture notes by Kubiatowicz.

Protection vs Security

- Protection: one or more mechanisms for controlling the access of programs, processes, or users to resources - Page Table Mechanism - File Access Mechanism
- · Security: use of protection mechanisms to prevent misuse of resources
 - Misuse defined with respect to policy
 - » E.g.: prevent exposure of certain sensitive information
 - » E.g.: prevent unauthorized modification/deletion of data
 - Requires consideration of the external environment within which the system operates
 - » Most well-constructed system cannot protect information if user accidentally reveals password
- What we hope to gain today and next time
 - Conceptual understanding of how to make systems secure
 - Some examples, to illustrate why providing security is really hard in practice

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Authentication: Identifying Users

• How to identify users to the system?

- Passwords
 - » Shared secret between two parties
 - » Since only user knows password, someone types correct password' \Rightarrow must be user typing it
 - » Very common technique
- Smart Cards
 - » Electronics embedded in card capable of providing long passwords or satisfying challenge \rightarrow response gueries
 - » May have display to allow reading of password
 - » Or can be plugged in directly; several credit cards now in this category
- Biometrics
 - » Use of one or more intrinsic physical or behavioral traits to identify someone
 - » Examples: fingerprint reader. palm reader, retinal scan
 - » Becoming guite a bit more common

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Preventing Misuse

- Types of Misuse:
 - Accidental:
 - » If I delete shell, can't log in to fix it!
 - » Could make it more difficult by asking: "do you really want to delete the shell?"
 - Intentional:
 - » Some high school brat who can't get a date, so instead he transfers \$3 billion from B to A.
 - » Doesn't help to ask if they want to do it (of course!)
- Three Pieces to Security
 - Authentication: who the user actually is
 - Authorization: who is allowed to do what
 - Enforcement: make sure people do only what they are supposed to do
- Loopholes in any carefully constructed system:
 - Log in as superuser and you've circumvented authentication
 - Loa in as self and can do anything with your resources; for instance: run program that erases all of your files
 - Can you trust software to correctly enforce
- Authentication and Authorization?????

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Passwords: Secrecy

· System must keep copy of secret to check against passwords

'eggplant'

- What if malicious user gains access to list of passwords?
 - » Need to obscure information somehow
- Mechanism: utilize a transformation that is difficult to reverse without the right key (e.g. encryption)
- Example: UNIX /etc/passwd file
 - passwd—one way transform(hash)—encrypted passwd
 - System stores only encrypted version, so OK even if sómeone reads the file!
 - When you type in your password, system compares encrypted version
- Problem: Can you trust encryption algorithm?
 - Example: one algorithm thought safe had back door » Governments want back door so they can snoop
- Also, security through obscurity doesn't work » GSM encryption algorithm was secret; accidentally released; Berkeley grad students cracked in a few hours 12/01/08 Lec 26.8

Passwords: How easy to guess?

- Ways of Compromising Passwords
 - Password Guessing:
 - » Often people use obvious information like birthday, favorite color, girlfriend's name, etc...
 - Dictionary Attack:
 - » Work way through dictionary and compare encrypted version of dictionary words with entries in /etc/passwd
 - Dumpster Diving:
 - » Find pieces of paper with passwords written on them
 - » (Also used to get social-security numbers, etc)
- Paradox:
 - Short passwords are easy to crack
 - Long ones, people write down!
- Technology means we have to use longer passwords
 - UNIX initially required lowercase, 5-letter passwords: total of 26⁵=10million passwords
 - » In 1975, 10ms to check a password \rightarrow 1 day to crack
 - $_$ » In 2005, .01µs to check a password $\rightarrow 0.1$ seconds to crack
 - Takes less time to check for all words in the dictionary!

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Passwords: Making harder to crack

- How can we make passwords harder to crack?
 Can't make it impossible, but can help
- Technique 1: Extend everyone's password with a unique number (stored in password file)
 - Called "salt". UNIX uses 12-bit "salt", making dictionary attacks 4096 times harder
 - Without salt, would be possible to pre-compute all the words in the dictionary hashed with the UNIX algorithm: would make comparing with /etc/passwd easy!
 - Also, way that salt is combined with password designed to frustrate use of off-the-shelf DES hardware
- Technique 2: Require more complex passwords
 - Make people use at least 8-character passwords with upper-case, lower-case, and numbers
 - » 70⁸=6×10¹⁴=6million seconds=69 days@0.01µs/check
 - Unfortunately, people still pick common patterns » e.g. Capitalize first letter of common word, add one digit

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Passwords: Making harder to crack (con't)


- Technique 3: Delay checking of passwords
 - If attacker doesn't have access to /etc/passwd, delay every remote login attempt by 1 second
 - Makes it infeasible for rapid-fire dictionary attack
- Technique 4: Assign very long passwords
 - Long passwords or pass-phrases can have more entropy (randomness→harder to crack)
 - Give everyone a smart card (or ATM card) to carry around to remember password
 - » Requires physical theft to steal password
 - » Can require PIN from user before authenticates self
 - Better: have smartcard generate pseudorandom number
 - » Client and server share initial seed
 - » Each second/login attempt advances to next random number
- Technique 5: "Zero-Knowledge Proof"
 - Require a series of challenge-response questions
 - » Distribute secret algorithm to user
 - » Server presents a number, say "5"; user computes something from the number and returns answer to server
 - » Server never asks same "question" twice
- Often performed by smartcard plugged into system 12/01/08 Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008 Lec 26.11

Administrivia

- MIDTERM II: Wednesday December 3rd
 - 5:30-8:30pm, 10 Evans
 - All material from last midterm and up to today (lectures 13-26)
 - » Hopefully, all videos will be up by tomorrow
 - Includes virtual memory
 - One page of handwritten notes, both sides
- Review Session: Tuesday, Dec 2nd
 - 7:00-9:00, 310 Soda (Looking for larger room!)
- Final Exam
 - December 18th, 8:00–11:00am, 10 Evans
 - Covers whole course (except last lecture)
 - Two pages of handwritten notes, both sides
- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$ Final Topics: Any suggestions?

Authentication in Distributed Systems

• What if identity must be established across network?




- Need way to prevent exposure of information while still proving identity to remote system
- Many of the original UNIX tools sent passwords over the wire "in clear text"
 - » E.g.: telnet, ftp, yp (yellow pages, for distributed login) » Result: Snooping programs widespread
- What do we need? Cannot rely on physical security!
 - Encryption: Privacy, restrict receivers
 - Authentication: Remote Authenticity, restrict senders

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Private Key Cryptography

- Private Key (Symmetric) Encryption:
 - Single key used for both encryption and decryption
- Plaintext: Unencrypted Version of message
- · Ciphertext: Encrypted Version of message



- Important properties
 - Can't derive plain text from ciphertext (decode) without access to key
 - Can't derive key from plain text and ciphertext
 - As long as password stays secret, get both secrecy and authentication
- Symmetric Key Algorithms: DES, Triple-DES, AES 12/01/08 Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008 Lec 26.14

Key Distribution


- How do you get shared secret to both places?
 - For instance: how do you send authenticated, secret mail to someone who you have never met?
 - Must negotiate key over private channel
 - » Exchange code book
 - » Key cards/memory stick/others
- Third Party: Authentication Server (like Kerberos)
 - Notation:
 - » K_{xy} is key for talking between x and y
 - » (...)^K means encrypt message (...) with the key K
 - » Clients: A and B, Authentication server S
 - A asks server for key:
 - » $A \rightarrow S$: [Hi! I'd like a key for talking between A and B] » Not encrypted. Others can find out if A and B are talking
 - Server returns *session* key encrypted using B's key » S→A: Message [Use K_{ab} (This is A! Use K_{ab}^{Ksb}] Ksa» This allows A to know, "S said use this key"
 - Whenever A wants to talk with B
 - » $A \rightarrow B$: Ticket [This is A! Use K_{ab}]^{Ksb}
 - » Now, B knows that K is sanctioned by S Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008

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Lec 26,13

Authentication Server Continued [Kerberos]




- Details
 - Both A and B use passwords (shared with key server) to decrypt return from key servers
 - Add in timestamps to limit how long tickets will be used to prevent attacker from replaying messages later
 - Also have to include encrypted checksums (hashed version of message) to prevent malicious user from inserting things into messages/changing messages
 - Want to minimize # times A types in password
 - » $A \rightarrow S$ (Give me temporary secret)
 - » S \rightarrow A (Use K_{temp-sa} for next 8 hours)^{Ksa}

» Can now use K_{temp-sa} in place of K_{sa} in prototool Kubidtowicz C5162 ©UCB Fall 2008 12/01/08


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Public Key Encryption



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Bob



- It is infeasible to locate two messages, m_1 and m_2 , which "collide", i.e. for which $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$
- A small change in a message changes many bits of digest/can't tell anything about message given its hash

- MD5: 128-bit output

- SHA-1: 160-bit output, SHA-256: 256-bit output
- Can we use hashing to securely reduce load on server?


Use of Hash Functions

Public Key Encryption Details

- Yes. Use a series of insecure mirror servers (caches)
- First, ask server for digest of desired file » Use secure channel with server
- Then ask mirror server for file

Several Standard Hash Functions:

- » Can be insecure channel
- » Check digest of result and catch faulty or malicious mirrors



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
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Signatures/Certificate Authorities

Security through SSL

- SSL Web Protocol
 - Port 443: secure http





- Server has a certificate signed by certificate authority
 - Contains server info (organization, IP address, etc)
 - Also contains server's public key and expiration date
- Establishment of Shared, 48-byte "master secret"
 - Client sends 28-byte random value n, to server
 - Server returns its own 28-byte random value n_s, plus its certificate cert.
 - Client verifies certificate by checking with public key of certificate authority compiled into browser » Also check expiration date
 - Client picks 46-byte "premaster" secret (pms), encrypts it with public key of server, and sends to server
 - Now, both server and client have n_c, n_s, and pms » Each can compute 48-byte master secret using one-way and collision-resistant function on three values

» Random "nonces" n and n make sure master secret fresh Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008 Lec 26.22 12/01/08 Lec 26.22

SSL Pitfalls

- Netscape claimed to provide secure comm. (SSL)
 - So you could send a credit card # over the Internet
- Three problems (reported in NYT):
 - Algorithm for picking session keys was predictable (used time of day) - brute force key in a few hours
 - Made new version of Netscape to fix #1, available to users over Internet (unencrypted!)
 - » Four byte patch to Netscape executable makes it always use a specific session key
 - » Could insert backdoor by mangling packets containing executable as they fly by on the Internet.
 - » Many mirror sites (including Berkeley) to redistribute new version - anyone with root access to any machine on LAN at mirror site could insert the backdoor
 - Buggy helper applications can exploit any bug in either Netscape, or its helper applications

Recall: Authorization: Who Can Do What? · How do we decide who is authorized object F_1 F_2 F_3 printe domain D, read read D_{2} nrint D_3 read execute read read D_4 write write

group of permissions » E.g. above: User D_3 can read F_2 or execute F_3

- In practice, table would be huge and sparse!

Two approaches to implementation

» A domain might be a user or a

to do actions in the system?

all permissions in the system

» Files, Devices, etc...

- Resources across top

- Domains in columns

Access Control Matrix: contains

- Access Control Lists: store permissions with each object » Still might be lots of users!
 - » UNIX limits each file to: r,w,x for owner, group, world
 - » More recent systems allow definition of groups of users and permissions for each group
- Capability List: each process tracks objects has permission to touch
 - » Popular in the past, idea out of favor today
- » Consider page table: Each process has list of pages it has access to, not each page has list of processes ... 12/01/08

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How fine-grained should access control be?


- Example of the problem:
 - Suppose you buy a copy of a new game from "Joe's Game World" and then run it.
 - It's running with your userid
 - » It removes all the files you own, including the project due the next day...
- How can you prevent this?
 - Have to run the program under *some* userid.
 - » Could create a second games userid for the user, which has no write privileges.
 - » Like the "nobody" userid in UNIX can't do much
 - But what if the game needs to write out a file recording scores?
 - » Would need to give write privileges to one particular file (or directory) to your games userid.
 - But what about non-game programs you want to use, such as Quicken?
 - » Now you need to create your own private *quicken* userid, if you want to make sure tha the copy of Quicken you bought can't corrupt non-quicken-related files

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- But - how to get this right??? Pretty complex...
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Authorization Continued

• Principle of least privilege: programs, users, and systems should get only enough privileges to perform their tasks - Very hard to do in practice » How do you figure out what the minimum set of privileges is needed to run your programs? - People often run at higher privilege then necessary » Such as the "administrator" privilege under windows • One solution: Signed Software - Only use software from sources that you trust, thereby dealing with the problem by means of authentication - Fine for big, established firms such as Microsoft, since they can make their signing keys well known and people trust them » Actually, not always fine: recently, one of Microsoft's signing keys was compromised, leading to malicious software that looked valid - What about new startups? » Who "validates" them? » How easy is it to fool them? 12/01/08 Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008 Lec 26.26





Different Authorization Domains

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
- Issues: Are all user names in world unique?
 - No! They only have small number of characters » kubi@mit.edu → kubitron@lcs.mit.edu →
 - kubitron@cs.berkelev.edu
 - » However, someone thought their friend was kubi@mit.edu and I got very private email intended for someone else...
 - Need something better, more unique to identify person
- Suppose want to connect with any server at any time?
 - Need an account on every machine! (possibly with different user name for each account)
 - OR: Need to use something more universal as identity » Public Keys! (Called "Principles")

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» People are their public keys
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Distributed Access Control



Analysis of Previous Scheme

Positive Points:

- Identities checked via signatures and public keys

» Client can't generate request for data unless they have private key to go with their public identity » Server won't use ACLs not properly signed by owner of file

- No problems with multiple domains, since identities

designed to be cross-domain (public keys domain neutral) Revocation:

- What if someone steals your private key?

» Need to walk through all ACLs with your key and change...! » This is very expensive

- Better to have unique string identifying you that people place into ACLs
 - » Then, ask Certificate Authority to give you a certificate matching unique string to your current public key
 - » Client Request: (request + unique ID)^{Cprivate}; give server certificate if they ask for it.
 - » Key compromise must distribute "certificate revocation", since can't wait for previous certificate to expire.

- What if you remove someone from ACL of a given file? » If server caches old ACL, then person retains access!

» Here, cache inconsistency leads to security violations!

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Conclusion

- User Identification
 - Passwords/Smart Cards/Biometrics
- Passwords
 - Encrypt them to help hid them
 - Force them to be longer/not amenable to dictionary attack
 - Use zero-knowledge request-response techniques
- Distributed identity
- Use cryptography
- Symmetrical (or Private Key) Encryption
 - Single Key used to encode and decode
 - Introduces key-distribution problem
- Public-Key Encryption
 - Two keys: a public key and a private key
- Secure Hash Function
 - Used to summarize data
 - Hard to find another block of data with same hash
- Authorization
 - Abstract table of users (or domains) vs permissions
- Implemented either as access-control list or capability list 12/01/08 Kubiatowicz CS162 ©UCB Fall 2008 Lec 26.30